

Review Article

Does Nonviolence Work?

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Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

Andreas Schedler, *The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Guillermo Trejo, *Popular Movements in Autocracies: Religion, Repression, and Indigenous Collective Action in Mexico* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Images of Gandhian protesters strike an emotional chord. The dream of using civil disobedience—sit down strikes, peaceful marches, and symbolic appeals to the moral conscious of oppressors—to combat injustice entices as it inspires. Though Gandhi and his followers helped evict the British Empire from India and peaceful protest helped end Jim Crow in the U.S. South, skeptics often retort that these cases are exceptions to the rule. After all, armed struggle toppled the czars in Russia, ended Batista's dictatorship in Cuba, and incited political change in numerous cases of social and political revolution. Which stance is correct?

Chenoweth and Stephan, like many researchers in peace and conflict studies, argue that nonviolence works. Civil disobedience can topple dictators. It can end foreign occupations or even spearhead territorial succession. Gene Sharp, a US political theorist based in Boston, Massachusetts, is perhaps the most prominent exponent of the efficacy of nonviolent protest. Sharp gained worldwide attention when Arab Spring activists cited his ideas and methods as their guide, though his work has previously inspired protesters in Serbia and elsewhere.¹ Kurt Schock and Sharon Nepstad are two sociologists that use case studies to explain how social movements oust dictators.² Jan Teorell is

one of the few comparativists to test a version of this claim; he finds that peaceful protest is associated with democratization between 1972 and 2006.³

The econometric rigor of *Why Civil Resistance Works* distinguishes it in the field of peace studies—and makes it relevant for comparative politics. Chenoweth and Stephan assemble an impressive database of 323 nonviolent and violent campaigns (at least three-fourths of which aim to depose dictators) in the twentieth century in a book that won the 2012 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award from the American Political Science Association. They develop several statistical models to show that peaceful protest is more successful than armed struggle in overthrowing dictatorship, expelling foreign occupations, and promoting succession. Civil resistance is more successful because it raises the costs of repression for incumbents and, most importantly, encourages military factions to turn against the dictator. The most innovative step in their work is the use of an instrumental variables approach to solve the riddle of endogeneity between non-violence and success. Perhaps nonviolence is effective because all the cases of success have another variable in common (an educated and well-organized civil society, for example), one that explains why nonviolence leads to political success.

The concern with endogeneity is a sure sign of scientific progress in the subfields of contentious politics, revolutionary politics, and regime survival. It is also a major concern of Guillermo Trejo's *Popular Movements in Autocracies*. Trejo scrutinizes the case of gradual democratization in Mexico under the rule of the PRI, perhaps the most infamously stable dictatorship of the twentieth century. Like Chenoweth and Stephan, Trejo analyzes a large database. Unlike these authors, he favors a subnational design, which allows him to control for a range of factors and to avoid the underreporting of data that plagues, as we shall see, so many cross-national databases. This book provides a model of how to study protest and regime change as it raises doubts about whether nonviolence really works.

The Politics of Uncertainty, by Andreas Schedler, explores a central topic in the study of nonviolent regime change. He analyzes the dynamics of authoritarian regimes that hold elections. Schedler points out that these paradoxical regimes have been on the rise since the end of the Cold War, largely at the expense of manifestly authoritarian systems. *The Politics of Uncertainty* is an elegantly written book that draws upon a database of 194 elections in fifty-one countries between 1980 and 2002. It argues that the struggle over institutional arrangements liberalizes autocracies. Institutional reform, Schedler contends, can even unseat tyrants. He examines a set of topics missing from Chenoweth and Stephan's book, namely: why autocrats agree to open their regimes and sometimes even agree to turn power over to their opponents.

Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik's *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-communist Countries* examines a dozen cases in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to understand how opposition parties win elections that force autocrats to relinquish power. Bunce and Wolchik rely upon interviews with 200 key leaders to understand why electoral—and nonviolent—campaigns succeeded in defeating incumbents in a sample of nine cases of electoral authoritarianism. Bunce and Wolchik remind us that civil disobedience typically springs from campaigns to defeat autocrats at the

polls; registering and canvassing voters, developing a marketing strategy, and poll watching are central to campaigns seeking to unseat dictators. Their book is contextually oriented comparative politics at its best.

My review of these four books—in combination with related research—concludes that nonviolence may not be more successful than violence in toppling dictators. My review, moreover, suggests that it is misleading to assume that the opposition decides how to end a dictatorship. Instead, autocrats make the choices that shape whether protest remains peaceful or becomes violent. Settling the debate about the effectiveness of civil disobedience therefore requires the study of authoritarianism as well as political protest. Explaining regime change necessitates the systematic analysis of authoritarianism championed by Schedler, the intensive study of electoral campaigns recommended by Bunce and Wolchik, and the multi-method analysis of social protest and regimes pioneered by Trejo.

The Logic of Nonviolent Protest

Analysts and activists in the field of peace studies were the first to argue that civil disobedience could transform dictatorship. Gene Sharp, in particular, has a slew of books and pamphlets to explain how a disciplined commitment to nonviolence can neutralize state repression and unseat dictators.⁴ Paraphrasing Sharp, Chenoweth and Stephen suggest that nonviolence includes “boycotts (social, economic, and political), strikes, protests, sit-ins, stay-aways, and other acts of civil disobedience and noncooperation to mobilize publics to oppose or support difference policies, to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries power” (p. 12).

It is surprising that so few comparativists have evaluated whether nonviolence is more effective than violence. None of the books I review discusses Sharp’s work. Bunce and Wolchik make passing references to some of the nonviolence and civil disobedience literature and Schedler briefly mentions Sharp on two occasions (pp. 53, 303). Trejo cites Kurt Schock’s *Unarmed Insurrections*. Part of this omission may be that Sharp never published in scholarly journals, certainly not in the key outlets for comparative politics and allied subfields or fields of social scientific inquiry. His work does not contain formal models or use of explicit rules for collecting and analyzing data.

Neglecting the study of civil disobedience is, at least in part, an intellectual legacy of the subfield. The classics about social and political change—from Eric Wolf’s *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* to Theda Skocpol’s *States and Social Revolutions*—focus on peasant movements or guerrilla struggles to revolutionize societies.⁵ The fall of communism in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe dampened interest in social revolution, especially because the legacy of the Cuban, Iranian, Nicaraguan, and Vietnamese Revolutions was autocracy and the persistence of underdevelopment.⁶ Within comparative politics, the study of revolution gradually morphed into the study of civil war and why the use of violence persists, despite its horrific costs.⁷

There is another reason why comparativists largely ignore the question of the effectiveness of nonviolent collective action. Although peace studies researchers and comparativists analyze the Third Wave of democratization, comparativists have focused on the “high politics” of the demise of authoritarianism and especially the nature and logic of successor political systems.⁸ Among comparativists, work on democratic transitions rarely examines the “low politics” of regime change, despite the fact that political protest is a central part of transitions from authoritarian rule.⁹ That graduate training in political science provides ample training for studying party systems, voters, legislatures, executives, and other formal political arenas is yet another reason why comparativists concentrate on political institutions and their dynamics.

Within the subfield of comparative politics, two of the major exceptions are Sydney Tarrow and Jan Teorell. Tarrow’s work on “contentious politics” is part of his dialogue with sociologists, including Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly, about the role of social movements in western democracies.¹⁰ Teorell’s book finds that nonviolent demonstrations are statistically associated with democratic transitions, but riots, strikes, and armed conflict are not.¹¹ Historically minded sociologists like John Markoff and Tilly write books about the role of peasant and worker’s movements in the democratization of the west.¹² Others like Evelyn Huber and Ruth Berins Collier collaborate with sociologists to explain how working class organizations have shaped long-term regime trajectories in Europe and Latin America.¹³ And a few political scientists, like Elisabeth Jean Wood, argue that guerrilla movements and street protesters can create an “insurgent route to democracy.”¹⁴ These poor people’s movements, in fact, are the modern day equivalent of the nineteenth century’s proletarian organizations.

Protest turns out to be important for regime change. Chenoweth and Stephan analyze more than one hundred nonviolent campaigns during the twentieth century, which have two distinguishing characteristics. First, they use a combination of the 198 tactics of civil disobedience that Sharp has identified, and, second, these campaigns “deliberately or necessarily circumvent normal political channels and employ non-institutional (and often illegal) forms of action against an opponent” (p. 12). Most of these—more than sixty—date to the period since 1980 or slightly less than a quarter of the country-years in their database (pp. 6–10). Slightly fewer than forty of these campaigns are from the first seven decades of the twentieth century, which is an underestimate, perhaps even a serious underestimate, of largely pacific efforts to unseat unsavory dictatorships. Even in the three decades before the end of the Cold War—when comparative politics and sociology turned their gaze to the developing world—there were numerous attempts to liberalize authoritarian rule.

Researchers in the field of international relations were among the first political scientists to examine this question statistically. Chenoweth and Stephan’s book bears the imprint of training in this subfield of the discipline. First, they assume that governments are unitary and largely rational actors. They rarely analyze the structure or nature of governments to understand whether certain types of regimes are more likely to change. They say little about distinctions among autocracies. Political systems in *Why Civil Resistance Works* are either democratic or autocratic, with this binary classification

based upon Polity IV's widely used, if not always empirically valid, database. Chenoweth and Stephan label regimes ranked in the bottom half of Polity IV's 20-point scale as autocratic (p. 66), even if common practice is to restrict this designation to the bottom quarter of the scale. This is an eminently empiricist, if practical, choice; it facilitates regression analysis, even if it is not anchored in a set of theoretical expectations about the behavior of regimes.

Second, Chenoweth and Stephan categorize opposition responses to dictatorship as violent or nonviolent, which is very much like characterizing relations between nation-states as diplomatic or warlike. Whether opponents began with one approach and gravitated to another or whether different groups use one or the other (or both) is a topic absent from their book. Whether movements are diffuse or centralized, whether there are moderates or hardliners, are also topics that Chenoweth and Stephan do not address.

Neither the assumption about unitary states nor the binary conception of opposition campaigns is necessarily "wrong," but they spring from an approach that conceptualizes the domestic political arena as a mirror of the international one; they are also a way to partition national politics that help build an empirical case for the effectiveness of non-violence. For comparativists, both are unusual decisions to have made. To their credit, Chenoweth and Stephan acknowledge problems with their first assumption (p. 12), but, regarding the second, suggest that "it is nevertheless possible to characterize a campaign as principally nonviolent based on the primacy of nonviolent resistance methods and the nature of the participation in that form of resistance" (p. 12).

Why Civil Disobedience Works makes two fundamental empirical claims. First, nonviolence is more successful than violence. While 60 percent of nonviolent campaigns succeed in overthrowing autocrats, less than 30 percent of insurrections topple the dictator, according to the cases in Chenoweth and Stephan's database. Civil resistance is more successful, they claim, because a campaign that mobilizes a population requires a concerted effort to repress; moreover, several models indicate that instances of civil resistance "have been most successful when they have produced security-force defections" (p. 58). Splitting the ruling bloc, especially its security apparatus, turns out to be key for Chenoweth and Stephan. It is a claim that recurs in the literature on non-violent change; it is what Leon Trotsky emphasizes in his own account of the (rather violent) Russian revolution, though he argues that it is just one of several causes of regime collapse.¹⁵

Second, several regression models show that nonviolence is much more likely to lead to democracy than civil war. Five years after the end of the conflict, a regime is 45 percent more likely to be democratic if the opposition uses nonviolent struggle to overthrow the dictatorship (pp. 212–15). These are audacious claims, which we take seriously because of the sophistication of the methods in this book. And they are remarkable because they challenge our skepticism and fuel our optimism.

An immediate objection about the first finding is that an omitted variable is driving these results. The success of nonviolent campaigns, the skeptic will propose, must stem from another characteristic that these societies or political systems have in common. Chenoweth and Stephan respond by, in the first place, controlling for rival explanations

and other factors in a series of logistic regression models (with robust standard errors clustered by country) (pp. 70–71).¹⁶ Countries with smaller populations are more likely to experience a peaceful change in regime. The nature or openness of a regime, as proxied by its Polity IV score, has no bearing on the success of a nonviolent campaign. More repressive regimes, however, reduce—but do not eliminate—the success rate of nonviolent campaigns. In none of these cases do additional variables (and several geographic and temporal controls) rob the nature of the campaign of its statistical significance.

In the second place, Chenoweth and Stephan use an Instrumental Variables approach to determine whether another factor is what explains why nonviolent campaigns are more successful than violent ones. This is a statistical procedure that determines whether a variable of interest (nonviolent campaigns) is highly correlated with another one (the instrument), but is uncorrelated with the dependent variable (success or its absence) or the model's error term. It is often impossible to find such a variable. Chenoweth and Stephan assemble one on the premise that opposition movements choose civil disobedience when the conditions are ripe for its use and resort to violence because conditions are fundamentally different. So, they opt for an instrument that is a composite variable of the conditions that typically lead to violent resistance on the assumption that it is these conditions that are responsible for the success of nonviolent campaigns. This variable remains negative (and statistically significant) in a series of new models; conditions ripe for the development of violent campaigns, in other words, do not lead to the success of these campaigns. From this finding, Chenoweth and Stephan infer that nonviolent campaigns do not develop where they are most likely to succeed (pp. 79–82).

Why Civil Resistance Works is right that successful nonviolent campaigns are more likely to lead to stable democracy than violent ones. But, as I show, there are several reasons to doubt that nonviolent campaigns are more successful than violent ones in overthrowing dictatorships. Analyzing Trejo's book on protest in electoral autocracies will help to identify the empirical limitations of Chenoweth and Stephan's arguments. It also will spark a discussion of whether it is useful to presuppose that the opposition decides whether to remain peaceful or become violent, the key premise in Chenoweth and Stephan's theoretical framework.

Protest in Autocracies

In *Popular Movements in Autocracies*, Guillermo Trejo analyzes the demise of authoritarianism in Mexico, the longest lasting electoral autocracy of the twentieth century. It is hard to underestimate both the originality and methodological sophistication of this densely written work of comparative politics. Instead of emphasizing the behavior of opposition parties and ordinary voters in democratizing Mexican politics, Trejo highlights the role that indigenous peasants—some of the poorest people in Mexico—played in ending the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) seventy-year rule.¹⁷ He also uses time series cross-sectional statistical models, focused comparisons, and even (ethnographic)

natural experiments to disentangle the causes and effects of popular protest and regime collapse in the modern world. Trejo, in other words, revives an older tradition, that of comparative political sociology—one that studied the revolutionary potential of peasants and associated with the work of Jeffrey Paige, Theda Skocpol, and Eric Wolf—while putting this classical approach on firmer methodological and theoretical grounds.¹⁸

Like Chenoweth and Stephan's (and Bunce and Wolchik's) book, *Popular Movements in Autocracies* concentrates upon the behavior of opposition protesters. Unlike Chenoweth and Stephan, however, Trejo takes regime dynamics seriously. While Trejo does not theorize about electoral autocracy, his analysis is sensitive to the changing dynamics of Mexican authoritarianism. Most importantly, he argues that the choices dictators make shape whether the opposition chooses peaceful protest or armed struggle. Opposition movements, in others words, become violent if incumbents become brutal.

An impressive database exists at the core of Trejo's book. Along with a half-dozen assistants, Trejo spent several years coding reports on protest and violence from dozens of national and local Mexican newspapers. The database consists of information about protests of an average of 200 people in 883 Mexican municipalities (approximately a third of these jurisdictions) with at least 10 percent of their population being indigenous between 1975 and 2000.¹⁹

Analysis of the database on indigenous protest makes an important contribution to the study of religion and politics, one which sets the stage for his argument that the behavior of regimes shapes opposition strategies. Indigenous peoples organized to protect their rights and even became guerrillas in municipalities where Protestants began to proselytize in the 1960s and 1970s. Until it had to compete to retain the loyalty of its flock, the Roman Catholic Church, like a lazy monopolist, offered its parishioners little more than the ecclesiastical fare it had for decades. When faced with the competition for souls, it shifted to reinterpreting the Bible in light of the experience of indigenous peoples, an approach that allowed church deacons, activists, and the laity to ally with the left in Mexico.²⁰

A far-reaching conclusion of Trejo's book disputes the claim that the opposition autonomously chooses whether a conflict becomes violent. Unlike Chenoweth and Stephan's book, *Popular Movements in Autocracies* contends that the opposition organizes an insurgency in response to the government's choice to repress its opponents. Trejo conducts cross-state statistical analysis and a focused most similar systems comparison between the states of Chiapas and Oaxaca to demonstrate the veracity of his argument. The indigenous guerrillas of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) declared war on the Mexican state in early 1994 in the southern state of Chiapas because Governor Patrocinio González, elected in 1988, had launched a hardline campaign against protestors and community organizers. In the nearby state of Oaxaca, Governor Heladio Ramírez, elected in 1986, opted to reform, and not jail, social movements.

The ordered probit models of the determinants of indigenous rebel activity among Mexico's thirty-one states during the 1990s make two points. First, less repressive and more electorally open regimes—as existed in several northern states in Mexico—would have inhibited the formation of a rural insurgency. Second, the models only hint at the

converse; they do not demonstrate that hardline regimes in the north would have provoked guerrilla attacks. These results remind us that a series of events and developments leads to the existence of social movements that can then be provoked into becoming violent. In the earlier parts of his book, after all, Trejo explains how an exogenous event, Protestant proselytizing, led the Catholic Church to develop progressive networks in some places of Mexico.

To understand why peasants become guerrillas, Trejo compares Chiapas with Oaxaca, two states with almost identical GDP per capita rates and levels of income inequality, similar poverty levels and mountainous geographies, and half of whose populations live in rural areas. Chiapas and Oaxaca are the two most ethnically complex states in Mexico; a quarter of the population of Chiapas is indigenous while almost 40 percent Oaxaca's population is. Communities also jointly own and manage 52 and 71 percent of their lands. And, most importantly, the Catholic Church organized progressive networks in both states. Peasants also went to the streets in both states, but only in Chiapas did collective action turn violent.

It was the behavior of the state, as Trejo's models suggest, that explains why Oaxaca remained quiescent while Chiapas exploded. Governor Ramírez of Oaxaca did not incarcerate and torture protesters. He supported an electoral reform that empowered Oaxaca's more than 500 municipalities to develop customary law to elect their own local authorities. Governor González of Chiapas, in contrast, confronted protesters. From his inauguration as governor of the state, he promised zero-tolerance for land occupations and other forms of protest. He had a pliant state legislature rewrite the penal code to impede the freedom of assembly. His police forces jailed dozens of protesters.

Autocratic behavior only triggers violence, Trejo argues, when a social movement exists to channel the grievances that citizens have. He makes much of the point that dense, decentralized social networks sustain movements when governments become repressive. And, if sufficiently provoked, citizens will use this type of social capital to respond to violence with violence. If the opposition cannot build or attract the support of existing organizations, dictatorships remain unchallenged, Trejo reminds us. They easily identify and jail troublemakers. This is, in fact, what happened in parts of Mexico without the decentralized networks of hundreds of activists that the Catholic Church and the left assembled. Once decapitated, these movements disintegrated while the rest of society (rationally) chose to remain passive.

Chapter eight of Trejo's book echoes and undermines Chenoweth and Stephan's claim that civil resistance foments democratization. While civil disobedience pressured the regime, it was violence—the 1994 Zapatista rebellion coincided with the start of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—that made it quake. Trejo argues that indigenous peasant protest and an incipient guerrilla movement prompted outgoing President Carlos Salinas (1988–94) and incoming President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) to enact fundamental electoral reforms—including the 1996 reform that removed the federal executive from appointing officials and otherwise managing the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)—that led to the PRI's defeat in the 2000 elections. Far from hindering regime change, armed conflict served the cause of protest because the PRI feared

the political consequences of the formation of an alliance between the recently formed Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD) (who believed that the PRI had robbed its leader, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, of the presidency in the 1988 elections) and the Zapatistas. Perhaps it was the threat of even more violence that made the regime negotiate with opposition moderates, what social movement theorists call a “positive radical flank effect.”

Trejo is right to suggest that it was contentious peasants and the slide toward violent confrontation that transformed Mexico. Rethinking the timing and sequence of events suggests that it is easy to overestimate the role of nonviolent protest in opening up dictatorship. We may also be mislabeling some transitions as gradual and peaceful because we find the image of visionary, national-level leaders like Nelson Mandela in South Africa compromising for the sake of democracy comforting.²¹ Nonetheless, it is equally important not to overlook the fact that repeated economic crises gradually turned Mexican voters against the PRI. The development of a moderate electorate that wanted reform, but not revolution, reassured the PRI that elections would not automatically deprive it of power. Moreover, that the PRI retained the support of so many Mexicans led many in the party to conclude that keeping their opponents on the left (PRD) split from the right (PAN) was a realistic strategy for retaining power while also loosening the reins of power, especially in a plurality system for electing the federal president. Too much revolution might have coaxed the PRI into becoming the overt brute it was in so much of rural Mexico, as Trejo himself chillingly documents. When cornered, dictatorships react violently . . . and they often win.

An important implication of *Popular Movements in Autocracies* is that a cross-national database rather different from Chenoweth and Stephan’s might very well tell a different story. While we should applaud them for assembling a database on violent and nonviolent campaigns (which Chenoweth is continuing to revise),²² we should raise questions about, for example, its quality. We know that it is not comprehensive; some of their key statistical models lose up to half of the sample because of missing values (pp. 51–52, 70–71). For so many events in the developing world, the secondary sources are fragmentary and incomplete. The absence of data on the distribution of income and assets (especially before the 1990s), for large parts of the world, for example, hinders assessing the impact of inequality on political conflict. The basic facts of many elections—their results and quality—are incomplete for many countries. This is a key justification for the Varieties of Democracy project, which seeks to fill our void about the nuts and bolts of political systems.²³ Our knowledge of informal politics, of street protests, of opposition marches, of clandestine meetings, and of efforts to bring down dictatorship is even less comprehensive. This is something that we have heard before; more than two decades ago, Charles D. Brockett warned that cross-national databases were inaccurate portraits of street protest and opposition-led marches.²⁴

Let me provide some examples to document my claim that Chenoweth and Stephan’s database is incomplete. Table 1 contains a list of violent and nonviolent campaigns in Central America since 1900. The first conclusion to draw is that the database fails to include thirteen of the twenty-six campaigns on the isthmus, eleven of which

were nonviolent. None of these campaigns, I should add, requires reading obscure Spanish-language sources. Several books exist on the 1948 civil war in Costa Rica.²⁵ At least two books exist on nonviolent campaigns in El Salvador.²⁶ And, while information on Guatemala is scarcer, a comprehensive dissertation and a handful of books exist on protest, violence, coups, and politics between 1920 and the mid-1980s.²⁷

Table 1 Non-Violent and Violent Campaigns are Equally Successful

Country	Start	End	Target Regime
Non-Violent Campaigns			
<i>Successful</i>			
El Salvador	1944	1944	Martínez
El Salvador*	1960	1960	Lemus
Guatemala*	1919	1921	Estrada Cabrera
Guatemala*	1944	1944	Military Junta
Guatemala	1944	1944	Ubico
Costa Rica* (ps)	1944	1948	Picado
<i>Failure</i>			
Costa Rica*	1947	1947	Picado
El Salvador*	1927	1931	Romero Bosque
El Salvador*	1946	1946	Castañeda Castro
El Salvador*	1962	1972	Military Junta
El Salvador	1979	1981	Military-Civilian Junta
Guatemala*	1958	1964	Military
Guatemala*	1972	1981	Military
Nicaragua*	1978	1979	Somoza
<i>42 Percent Success Rate (6/14)</i>			
Violent Campaigns			
<i>Success</i>			
Costa Rica*	1944	1948	Picado
Guatemala	1954	1954	Arbenz
Nicaragua	1925	1932	US-backed regime
El Salvador (ps)	1979	1981	Military-Civilian Junta
Guatemala (ps)	1961	1996	Military
<i>Failure</i>			
El Salvador	1932	1932	Martínez
El Salvador*	1944	1944	Aguirre y Salinas
El Salvador	1961	1961	Military-Civilian Junta
Guatemala	1966	1972	military
Nicaragua	1973	1979	Somoza
Nicaragua	1980	1990	FSLN
Panama	1987	1989	Noriega
<i>41 Percent Success Rate (5/12)</i>			

*Cases Not in Chenoweth and Stephan's book. Note: ps=partial success.

Sources: See endnotes 24–28.

My scrutiny of a theoretically relevant part of the world also suggests that it is not always easy to distinguish between violent and nonviolent campaigns. Were the campaigns that ended with the 1948 civil war in Costa Rica just violent? The opposition had been organizing efforts to topple the government of President Teodoro Picado since 1944. So, these are nonviolent efforts that used the electoral arena as well as street protests to bring down a government that the opposition believed had come to power in a fraudulent election. Part of the campaign was always violent; hardline members of the opposition threw dozens of bombs and organized an insurrection throughout the 1940s. When pro-government deputies refused to certify the opposition candidate's victory in the 1948 elections, armed sectors of the opposition started a war that ended with the collapse of the small army and the government's defeat. Similarly, a sector of the opposition in Guatemala did start a guerrilla campaign in the early 1960s, which Chenoweth and Stephan duly note. However, it is misleading to label the effort to rid the country of yet another set of military dictators (typically winning rigged and closed elections) as exclusively violent. As Charles Brockett's data-rich book illustrates, there were two waves of street protests in Guatemala since the early 1960s.²⁸

The Central American data, if generalizable, modify Chenoweth and Stephan's claim about the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns. Eight of the thirteen cases they overlook are failures, and seven of these eight are nonviolent. When we include these omitted cases, the success rate of nonviolence falls to 42 percent, well below the 60 percent claimed by Chenoweth and Stephan from their sample of cases. The success rate for nonviolent action is not much higher than for violent campaigns. Two of the nine of my sample are successful campaigns; when we combine successful and partially successful campaigns, the rate is 41 percent, which is statistically no different from the success rate of nonviolent campaigns.

Note that this calculation accepts Chenoweth and Stephan's classification of the FSLN-struggle against Somoza as a failure (p. 236). The effectiveness of violence improves if we instead classify the overthrow of Somoza as a successful example of armed struggle (which is the universal view among specialists). The creative use of an Instrumental Variables approach to the topic notwithstanding, Chenoweth and Stephan's inference that nonviolence is more efficacious than violence may not be sustained when we add missing cases to their database.

Violence may have been the only way out of repressive dictatorship, even if civil war leads to the death and destruction that governments mostly cause. The Central American cases suggest that opposition factions went underground because marching in the streets and rallying in public squares led to massacres. In El Salvador and Guatemala, especially, political activists tried for decades to reform dictatorships peacefully. There were numerous political openings spearheaded by reformist officers working with labor unions, students, and opposition parties, as Table 1 indicates. And, in Central America at least, on the handful of occasions when reformist coalitions succeeded in coming to power—as in Guatemala in 1954 and in El Salvador in 1979—the US typically backed the return of the reactionary authoritarian coalition.

Who is responsible, then, for the ravages of war? I raise this question because Chenoweth and Stephan might be overestimating what opposition factions can do in difficult and shifting circumstances. While opponents should weigh the benefits and costs of taking up arms (and must face their responsibility for the death and destruction of civil war), it is debatable whether the opposition's decisions should be the centerpiece of analysis. Neither is it clear that we should hold them principally responsible for the carnage that violence, especially civil war, unleashes. It is governments (and allied forces) that are responsible for most conflict-related deaths.²⁹ While starting a war may be a strategic miscalculation, it is the behavior of rulers that shapes whether their opponents take to the hills or march in the streets.

Electoral Authoritarianism

The *Politics of Uncertainty* is the product of more than a decade of reflection and research on authoritarianism. It was Schedler who coined the term “electoral authoritarianism,” a concept he developed in a series of articles first appearing in the mid-1990s.³⁰ He added an unusual adjective before a well-known noun to draw attention to the fact that many dictatorships, paradoxically enough, hold elections. Schedler points out that these regimes have increased from twenty in 1988 to more than sixty by 1994. In six years, the number of these mixed regimes had tripled.

What, exactly, is electoral authoritarianism? An initial approximation is that it is a mixed regime, one that combines democratic and authoritarian characteristics. “Unlike other authoritarian regimes,” Schedler proposes, “electoral autocracies establish the entire set of formally representative institutions that characterize liberal democracy. Unlike electoral democracies, they subject these institutions to severe and systematic manipulation” so that the dictator and his entourage can remain in power (p. 6). It is when dictators scheme, either by rigging rules against their opponents, or violating the law or constitution itself, that the authoritarian tendency of such regimes manifests itself. This last point is key; it is the plot to stay in power that typifies these regimes.

The fact that incumbents in democracies also create laws and manipulate the public purse to their advantage makes for uncanny resemblances between these regimes. Democratic systems also feature politicians manipulating boundaries between electoral districts, reducing the powers of legislatures and increasing those of the executive, and otherwise designing institutions or deploying the budget to promote the interests of incumbents. Clever autocrats can defend their actions by underscoring the similarities with, say, the gerrymandering that is commonplace in majoritarian democracies. Yet, incumbents in competitive systems stop short of cheating (mostly, I suspect, to avoid being caught) and accept (however unwillingly) defeat at the ballot box.

This contradictory combination—of stable, even if biased, institutions concealing an arbitrary will to rule—creates opportunities for dramatic change. Schedler's central argument is that democratic façades create the spaces that can lead to liberalization and even democratization. They allow the opposition to pressure, whether from the streets

or from a handful of parliamentary seats, the government to level the playing field. A less biased electoral arena clears the way for the opposition to organize campaigns that perhaps can defeat the regime at the polls.

For Schedler, there are two types of electoral authoritarianism. He calls the first kind competitive autocracies. Operationally, a competitive electoral authoritarian system consists of a regime where the same party holds executive and legislative authority and systematically harasses the opposition. Slightly more than two-thirds of the elections in his database (of the 194 authoritarian elections in fifty-four countries between 1980 and 2002) occur in the least repressive form of autocracy. Schedler argues that these regimes are fundamentally not in equilibrium. The danger that the opponents could unite to defeat the incumbents is a real, though not likely outcome. Most of the regimes Bunce and Wolchik analyze in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union belong to this category.

The second type is hegemonic electoral autocracy. Schedler defines a hegemonic electoral authoritarianism as one where the incumbents have held the executive for at least ten years and control two-thirds of the seats in the lower house of the legislature. In hegemonic autocracies, like the one led by the PRI in Mexico, “the ruling party always wins, and is expected to, for it is popular and powerful, and perceived as such” (p. 192). These are “perfect dictatorships,” to employ the label coined by the Peruvian novelist, Mario Vargas Llosa, to describe Mexico under the PRI, because their reservoir of support conceals how they deploy arbitrariness and violence to deactivate the opposition.

Hegemonic regimes rarely break down. In perhaps the most important set of figures in his book, Schedler notes—based upon his database—that democratization follows slightly more than a fifth of elections in competitive autocracies (p. 342). Only 5 percent of elections in hegemonic systems lead to democracy; an additional 10.5 percent of elections in hegemonic systems lead to competitive autocracy. This suggests that transitions away from hegemony occur gradually, but the two-decade span of Schedler’s database does not permit speculating more about this. Retaining power for more than a decade and holding overwhelmingly large legislative majorities—the operational definition of such systems—means that they are largely immune to the uncertainties that plague their more competitive counterparts. Their supporters dwarf the typically fragmented opposition. In addition, their security apparatus successfully contains the insurgents and the protesters who challenge their authority.

In *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*, Bunce and Wolchik analyze eleven elections in nine countries to review a variety of hypotheses about why opposition movements sometimes unseat long-term incumbents in countries that previously had centrally planned economies and hegemonic (Communist) parties. Like Schedler, they emphasize the importance of the strategic interaction among government and opposition factions, but they eschew assembling a database of electoral autocracies. Unlike *The Politics of Uncertainty*, their book offers a context-rich account based, in part, on more than 200 interviews that, like Schedler’s tome, uncover findings of importance to students of political change. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries* makes an inspired argument about why and how certain types of elections can lead to democratization as it makes a case for context-dependent comparative studies.

Schedler's and Bunce and Wolchik's books tell consistent, but somewhat dissimilar, stories about political change in electoral authoritarian regimes. Both concur that the factors that mostly remain the same from year to year—inequality and ethnic fractionalization—do not explain why the opposition can win highly contested elections. While Bunce and Wolchik assemble tables that show that macro-economic factors are not consistently associated with outcomes in the eleven elections they analyze (pp. 30, 223), Schedler finds some evidence that competitive autocracies open up as they develop, even if development does not undermine the survival of hegemonic regimes (p. 356). His models also furnish some evidence that lack of economic growth undermines competitive autocracies, even as they reveal no effects on hegemonic regimes. But, like Bunce and Wolchik, Schedler's models containing economic and political variables indicate that GDP per capita has no effect on political change.

Both books also loosen the focus on the extra-legal protest that Chenoweth and Stephan emphasize. Schedler, as well as Bunce and Wolchik, suggests that understanding the demise or persistence of electoral authoritarian regimes requires analyzing campaigns, voters, and electoral laws. They contend that it is uncommon, but not impossible, for opponents to win elections in competitive autocracies such as Serbia. Bunce and Wolchik, in particular, explain that it takes organizational sophistication to defeat them at the polls. In what they call the "electoral model of political change," they argue that the autocrat loses elections when his opponents coalesce to run ambitious campaigns. Key for this model's success is long-term legal groundwork. Opening up access to the electoral rolls to facilitate voter registration helps. So does pressuring the electoral commission to make its decisions transparent and fair. As election day approaches, canvassing voters so that they turn up to vote also makes a big difference. Taking the time to develop and implement a multi-pronged strategy is the difficult recipe that not only unseats incumbents in competitive autocracies, but also in democracies. Persuading voters and deploying activists, in other words being political, is the key to unlocking the door to the executive mansion.

Schedler adds to and refines Bunce and Wolchik's explanation. First, he points out that something like this model works in only one out of five cases. As Bunce and Wolchik recognize, it is an uphill struggle to topple an electoral autocracy. Second, Schedler's statistical models suggest that opposition unity—a factor that Bunce and Wolchik repeatedly emphasize—is not associated with breakthrough elections. Opposition fragmentation, as measured by Rae's Index, does not differ between electoral authoritarian regimes that democratize and those that remain autocratic. Regardless of whether the opposition unites or splinters, narrow electoral results prompt competitive electoral authorities to democratize, but have no effect on hegemonic ones (p. 358).

Democratizing electoral authoritarian regimes, however, requires more than beating them at the polls. Failure to obtain more votes than the opposition is, by definition, the proximate cause of their downfall. But a narrow loss or a narrow, but questionable, win can lead to authoritarian retrenchment. The regime can ignore the results, as the military did in Algeria in 1991, when it cancelled runoff elections because the Islamic opposition won the popular elections in December of that year. It takes protest to force incumbents

to acknowledge their defeat in elections, as Chenoweth and Stephan would rightly remind us. In yet more statistical models (p. 363), Schedler demonstrates that pre-election protests lead hegemonic regimes to open more than four times as often as not having such protests ($p = 0.089$), even though post-election protests do not force hegemonic regimes to open. Protest has no discernable effect on democratizing competitive autocracies, though post-electoral protests “interrupt” the trajectories of these regimes. Their electoral cycles are thirty times more likely to “come to a halt through civil war, military coup, the suppression of opposition, or the extension of presidential mandates by more than half of the original term (by decree or referendum)” with post-electoral protest (p. 341). While the effect is large, its level is beyond conventional levels of statistical significance ($p = 0.118$) (p. 363).

Schedler also provides evidence that is both inconsistent and consistent with Chenoweth and Stephan’s argument about the superiority of nonviolent campaigns to foment regime change. He demonstrates that armed rebellion democratizes competitive electoral authoritarian regimes and leads to interruptions of such regimes. These relationships are highly unlikely to occur by chance ($p \leq 0.019$), but the odds ratios are much lower; they are 1.232 and 1.299, respectively (p. 363). Armed rebellion, however, does not seem to have much effect in opening hegemonic regimes (the odds ratio is 0.069 and $p=0.098$) (p. 363). Schedler’s results point out that violent struggle transforms competitive autocracies even while it, quite possibly, ensconces hegemonic regimes.

It is possible to quibble with the methods in both books. Drawing upon cross-national datasets or the findings of papers using them would have allowed Bunce and Wolchik to explain how their cases are similar to and different from other competitive autocracies. It would have helped them, for example, to avoid emphasizing the importance of opposition unity as a key element of the electoral model. Schedler’s cross-national statistical approach allows him to claim that opposition fragmentation does not undermine its ability to unseat the dictator.

While Schedler admirably analyzes the impact of electoral dynamics and political protest on regime survival, he relies upon a cross-national database of protest whose accuracy is not beyond question. Arthur Banks’s database draws upon reports in the *New York Times* and often misses reports of important street marches, boycotts, and sit-in campaigns. I suspect that Banks’s database is less likely to have these omissions during the two decades Schedler analyzes (1980s–2002) because the *Times* probably had correspondents in most places where the Third Wave crested. However, available critiques are not encouraging.³¹

Schedler’s models would have been stronger if he had controlled for country- or region-specific factors or period effects in many of his models. The 194 elections in his database are not entirely independent of each other. They occur in fifty-four countries. There are, in other words, background conditions that may be omitted variables. The Latin American cases, for example, have a history rather different from the centrally planned and Communist party dominated past of Eastern Europe or of the formerly socialist soviet republics. The capitalist economies, competitive party politics, and instability of Latin American political systems suggest that the construction and

dynamics of electoral autocracy could vary in systematic ways between these regions. Though Schedler is more than aware of the problem of endogeneity, which he unhelpfully defines as a problem of “reverse causality” (p. 214), he does not systematically test for it in his models.³² Explaining why these systems rarely democratize requires identifying the factors that transform these political systems.

Bunce and Wolchik commendably offer a more than plausible resolution of the problem of endogeneity. They entertain the argument that the electoral model is a proxy for regime weakness; perhaps a well-organized and coordinated campaign succeeds only when regimes are brittle. This factor could very well be endogenous to the electoral model itself, Bunce and Wolchik concede; but, they retort, perhaps it is the ability of the opposition to run a great campaign that provokes the regime splits that unseat the dictator. And they note, “no one within the community of democratic activists in Serbia, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, or Ukraine knew beforehand how the police, the internal security forces, and the military would respond to stolen elections and the popular protests that followed” (p. 244). Finally, Bunce and Wolchik argue that electoral authoritarian regimes survive not because they are strong, but because “they benefit from the absence of viable political alternatives” (p. 244). By persuading citizens that the opposition is credible and can run the country, Bunce and Wolchik propose, a well-organized campaign can weaken even the strongest of autocracies.

Conclusion

This essay reviews four recent books about political protest and dictatorship. Central to my review is the evaluation of the claim that peaceful protest—and not armed struggle—is the most effective way to end autocracy. This is an argument initially made by Gene Sharp and one given econometric testing by Chenoweth and Stephan via a database spanning the twentieth century in *Why Civil Resistance Works*. This and the claim that nonviolent regime change is more likely to democratize a political order are the two central findings of this award-winning book. The implication of their findings is clear: opposition movements should study Gandhi and not Che Guevara.

If only the record spoke this clearly. First, notwithstanding their Instrumental Variables solution to the problem of endogeneity (that is, whether peaceful campaigns succeed, but only in more open regimes), their conclusion rests upon an incomplete database of peaceful protest campaigns in the twentieth century. Missing values mean that many of their statistical models rely upon many fewer than the 323 campaigns that Chenoweth and Stephan identify in *Why Civil Resistance Works*. By including numerous peaceful efforts to reform harsh dictatorships overlooked by Chenoweth and Stephan in Central America—a region rife with struggles of a peaceful and violent nature during the twentieth century—I also show that the success rate of nonviolent campaigns is not superior to the success rate of violent struggle. Indeed, the success rates of both types of campaigns are (sadly) equal.

Second, Chenoweth and Stephan’s project hinges upon a dubious theoretical assumption, as the other books I review make clear. Asking whether civil disobedience is more

successful than guerrilla warfare assumes that the dictator's opponents get to choose which of these strategies to pursue. Trejo's comparison between Mexican municipalities and states, using a path-breaking database on indigenous protest, indicates that dictators make this (often fatal) choice. If incumbents opt for repression over reform, social movements go underground (especially, if they consist of decentralized social networks). If autocrats liberalize, then social movements remain peaceful.³³

Understanding the politics of authoritarian regimes is therefore indispensable for comprehending why dictatorships fall, as the research on the third wave of democratization suggests.³⁴ Subsequent research, including the books on electoral authoritarianism I review in this essay, build upon this insight. They show that whether an electoral autocracy is (minimally) competitive or hegemonic determines its political trajectory. In *The Politics of Uncertainty*, Schedler notes that the dictator's opponents can oust an incumbent and democratize the political system only after one in five elections. Only minimally open regimes, in other words, can experience the defection of key members of the governing coalition to allow peaceful campaigns to meet success. Hegemonic electoral autocracies, in contrast, rarely collapse. They prefer repression to contestation.

This review also suggests that it is necessary to analyze partisan strategies and, more broadly, the electoral arena, to comprehend why some authoritarian regimes fall. Protest may be necessary for the transition to a more democratic system, as Chenoweth and Stephan (and Schedler and Trejo, for that matter) would argue. Determining the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns requires systematically analyzing the structure and tactics of protest movements and linking them to the structure of opportunities that autocracies create. Taking to the streets, however, is a part of a well-planned electoral campaign to unseat a dictator, as *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries* explains. What Bunce and Wolchik call the electoral model only works in political environments that allow the opposition to register its candidates and compete for votes. The choices the opposition make do matter, but only in circumstances that permit the opposition to organize and shape the electoral arena.

Why Civil Resistance Works makes an invaluable contribution to the study of regime change in comparative politics. Chenoweth and Stephan's book raises an important question: whether peaceful protest is more effective than armed struggle in toppling dictatorship. But settling this debate requires systematically analyzing regimes as well as opposition movements. It demands building upon existing as well as new research on democratization, authoritarian regimes, and contentious politics.

NOTES

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1. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Shy U.S. Intellectual Created Playbook Used in a Revolution," *New York Times*, Feb. 16, 2011, p. A1. Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (New York: New Press, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012). See his website for a list of his other

publications: The Albert Einstein Institute, <http://www.aeinstein.org/>. I briefly discuss Sharp's ideas in the initial paragraph of the next section.

2. Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004). Also, see Sharon Erickson Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

3. Jan Teorell, *Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972–2006* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 100–16.

4. Other canonical work promoting nonviolence, in addition to the writings of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, is Peter Ackerman and Chris Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Praeger, 1994). Chenoweth and Stephan also survey the relevant documents within this tradition.

5. The key works include: Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper Row, 1969), Jeffrey M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), and Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Skocpol's own 1982 review essay, originally published in *Comparative Politics* ("What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?"), remains relevant. An expanded version is published as chapter 9 in her book, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

6. John Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Also, see Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

7. Some of the key works are: Robert H. Bates, *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), and, most recently, Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

8. See the canonical book: Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Also, see Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

9. Students of social movements also seem to neglect to study its impact on democratization. Donatella della Porta acknowledges that "the first challenge" in writing her own book on this topic "is the very limited attention that social movement studies had paid to democratization processes, strongly paralleled by the very limited attention democratization studies had paid to social movements (p. vii)." See her: *Mobilizing for Democracy: Comparing 1989 and 2011* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). An exception is John Markoff, *Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change* (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1996). Paradigm publishers issued a second edition of Markoff's book in late 2014.

10. Sydney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Revised and Updated Third Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 1998, 2011) and Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The *Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics* is an influential series, and I cite several books here.

11. See footnote 3.

12. Markoff; See, for example, Tilly's *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

13. Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) and Ruth Berins Collier, *Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

14. Elizabeth Jean Wood, *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

15. Leon Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, translated by Max Eastman (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1980), 165. I am indebted to John Markoff for this reference.

16. These models refer to the success of nonviolent (vs. violent) campaigns in toppling dictatorships, expelling foreign occupiers, and a few other cases.

17. A book very much in the spirit of Trejo's is: Todd A. Eisenstadt, *Courting Democracy in Mexico: Party Strategies and Electoral Institutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Trejo's book is usefully contrasted, among other texts, with: Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann, *Democratizing Mexico: Public*

Opinion and Electoral Choices (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Mauricio Merino, *La Transición Votada: Crítica a la Interpretación del Cambio Político en México* (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003), and Beatrice Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Another important book on the fall of the PRI is Kenneth F. Greene, *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

18. See footnote 5.

19. Trejo, *Popular Movement in Autocracies*, 61–65. On p. 61, he writes that “acts of protests include public accusations, marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes, road blockades, land invasions, occupation of government buildings, destruction of government buildings, and kidnapping and lynching of government authorities.”

20. Also, see Anthony Gill, *Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

21. I will have to revise my discussion of Mexico to reassess the impact of protest and violence on its democratization. See my “The Third and Fourth Waves of Democracy,” in Jeffrey Haynes, ed., *Routledge Handbook of Democratization* (London: Routledge, 2012), 273–86.

22. Erica J. Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 50 (May 2013), 415–23.

23. Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven Fish, Allen Hicken, Matthew Kroenig, Staffan I. Lindberg, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Holli A. Semetko, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, and Jan Teorell, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach,” *Perspectives on Politics*, 9 (June 2011), 247–67.

24. Charles D. Brockett, “Measuring Political Violence and Land Inequality in Central America,” *American Political Science Review*, 86 (March 1992), 169–76.

25. I discuss the research on the 1948 civil war in: “Class Conflict, Political Crisis, and the Breakdown of Democratic Practices in Costa Rica: Reassessing the Origins of the 1948 Civil War,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 23 (February 1991), 37–60.

26. See Paul Almeida, *Waves of Protest: Popular Struggle in El Salvador, 1925–2005* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). Charles D. Brockett, *Political Movements and Violence in Central America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

27. See Brockett, 2005, and Joseph A. Pitti, “Jorge Ubico and Guatemalan Politics in the 1920s,” Ph.D. Dissertation (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico, 1975).

28. Brockett, 2005. I also analyze these movements as part of a broader effort to assess the origins and outcomes of civil war. See my: *The Politics of Modern Central America: Civil War, Democratization, and Underdevelopment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

29. The truth commissions in El Salvador and Guatemala held the government responsible for 80 and 93 percent, respectively, of the estimated deaths. See Lehoucq, 92–93. For an accounting of the costs of war, see Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre, Håvard Moksleiv Nygård, Håvard Strand, “Development Consequences of Armed Conflict,” *World Development*, 40 (September 2012), 1713–22.

30. See his “Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation,” *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (April 2002), 36–50. Also, see Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

31. See Brockett, 1992 and Mark Herkenrath and Alex Knoll, “Protest Events in International Press Coverage: An Empirical Critique of Cross-national Conflict Databases,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 52 (June 2011), 163–80.

32. Reverse causality can be a source of endogeneity. Technically speaking, endogeneity exists when a Y variable (the explanandum) is correlated with something in the error term (which can be a potential explanan) in a regression equation. Especially with aggregate data, we can mistakenly identify a statistically significant variable as a cause of the phenomenon we wish to explain, when it is actually a manifestation of that something we cannot measure, but pick up in the error term. Endogeneity therefore afflicts much of the statistical work in comparative politics because cross-national databases contain a nonrandom sample of cases.

33. For a discussion of how opposition movements pick strategies in anticipation of what the dictator is likely to do, see: Vincent Boudreau, *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

34. See Lehoucq, “The Third and Fourth Waves of Democracy” and Barbara Geddes, “What Causes Democratization?” in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds., *The Oxford Handbook on Comparative Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 317–39.